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The ISAF Withdrawal from 
Afghanistan: Perceptions and 
Reactions of Regional Powers
Sandra Destradi, Nadine Godehardt and Alexander Frank
At a conference in Tokyo on 8 July 2012, Afghanistan’s donors pledged 16 billion USD 
in reconstruction aid over the next four years. At the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 
2012, a comparable sum had been committed to supporting the Afghanistan National 
Security Forces (ANSF).
Analysis
The international community is anxious to reassure the Afghan government that it 
will not be left to fend for itself after the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
troops are withdrawn at the end of 2014. Nevertheless, the fear remains that a power 
vacuum and another takeover by the Taliban could throw the country into turmoil once 
again.
  The destabilization of Afghanistan would most affect the neighboring countries. Yet 
despite sharing similar threat perceptions, these states are pursuing very different 
goals in Afghanistan that impede effective regional cooperation. 
  The US, which would like to see its influence in Afghanistan maintained, curbs all 
initiatives that are not in line with its interests.
  The US is pursuing the vision of an economically integrated region in which Af-
ghanistan will be the central stretch of a new “Silk Road” between Central and 
South Asia, and the Middle East and East Asia. The implicit notion is that econom-
ic integration will lead to increased stability in the security sector, but at best, that 
would only be attainable in the long term. In the short term, it is more likely that 
political differences between the regional states will hinder economic cooperation.
  China and India are aiming to more closely incorporate Afghanistan in regional or-
ganizations within their own spheres of influence. Both nations fear a post-2014 de-
stabilization of Afghanistan that would directly affect their security – especially 
through the strengthening of Islamist terror groups.
  Other states are also concerned about the developments in Afghanistan. Iran, for ex-
ample, is pursuing an ambivalent policy, fearing both the continuation of American 
influence after 2014 and a Taliban takeover.
Keywords: Afghanistan, India, USA, PR China, Shanghai Cooperation Organization
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The Impact of the NATO Troops’ Withdrawal 
from Afghanistan
On 8 July 2012, at a conference in Tokyo, some 60 
donor countries pledged to support Afghanistan 
over the next four years with 16 billion USD in re-
construction aid, which is tied to conditions. The 
Afghan government has committed itself to hold-
ing free and fair presidential and parliamentary 
elections in 2014 and 2015, to improving finan-
cial supervision and governance, and to more ef-
fectively fighting the rampant corruption. At the 
NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012, a com-
paratively high sum was agreed for support-
ing the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). 
Through these financial pledges, the internation-
al community seeks to prevent Afghanistan sink-
ing into chaos after withdrawal of the Internation-
al Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2014. They 
are also intended to signal to President Hamid 
Karzai’s government that the international com-
munity will continue to support Afghanistan af-
ter 2014. The “strategic partnership” agreement 
between the US and Afghanistan that was signed 
in May 2012 also serves this purpose. In addition, 
in July 2012, Afghanistan was declared a “major 
non-NATO ally” of the US – which should facili-
tate its access to weapons and military equipment. 
While the US is attempting to demonstrate its con-
tinued commitment to Afghanistan, it is also try-
ing to delegate as much responsibility as possi-
ble to other actors. Concurrently, there is repeated 
talk of the need for “regional solutions:” states in 
Afghanistan’s immediate vicinity should increas-
ingly be involved in efforts to stabilize the coun-
try and, to this end, should act cooperatively and 
increasingly independently. This particularly con-
cerns states that would be most affected by the 
possible destabilization of Afghanistan and the re-
turn of the Taliban to power.
The withdrawal of all NATO combat troops 
from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 was decid-
ed at the International Conference on Afghani-
stan in Bonn in December 2011, where it was al-
so stipulated that once the international forces 
were withdrawn, full responsibility for securi-
ty policy would be handed to the ANSF. Linked 
to vague pledges about a continued presence of 
NATO contingents in the country and efforts to 
find a regional solution to the conflict, this with-
drawal plan was presented as the basis for creat-
ing a stable Afghanistan. 
Today, however, the reality looks quite differ-
ent. The ANSF are not yet adequately equipped 
and trained to tend to security and stabili-
ty throughout the country. The continued pres-
ence of Taliban groups that are capable of exer-
cising force is indicated by incidents like the at-
tack and hostage taking at a luxury hotel at Qarga 
Lake near Kabul in June 2012. Added to this is the 
fact that it is still unclear how many ISAF troops – 
with which tasks – will remain in the country after 
2014. Plans for early withdrawals, like those an-
nounced by newly elected French president Fran-
çois Hollande at the NATO Summit in Chicago in 
May 2012, increasingly unnerve the allies. Fur-
thermore, because of the serious conflicts of in-
terest of all the actors, the effective transfer of re-
sponsibility to regional actors or even a resolution 
to regional conflicts like the US is hoping for could 
at best be achieved in the long run. Meanwhile, 
disagreements between the Karzai government, 
Pakistan and NATO are becoming ever clearer. It 
is doubtful whether it will be possible to ensure 
a stable Afghanistan after 2014 – the goal set by 
the Afghanistan Conference in Bonn. The devel-
opments in Afghanistan are being critically moni-
tored by regional powers such as India, Iran, Chi-
na, and Afghanistan’s neighboring states in Cen-
tral Asia. It is these states that will be directly af-
fected by changes in US strategy and the with-
drawal of Western powers from Afghanistan in 
the coming years.
The Change in US Foreign Policy and Strategy 
for Afghanistan
The ISAF troop withdrawal and the beginning of 
a so-called “Transformation Phase” in Afghani-
stan in 2014 are part of a fundamentally different 
American foreign and security policy. Substantial-
ly determined by Barack Obama’s election to the 
US presidency, this change was accelerated by a 
series of other factors, most importantly, the eco-
nomic and financial crisis. Since President Obama 
took office in January 2009, economic consolida-
tion, military caution and efforts to spread respon-
sibility for security policy among regional allies 
have been central to US policy. So, for example, 
in 2011, all combat troops were withdrawn from 
Iraq, and that same year military authority for the 
NATO operation in Libya was left to the allies. 
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The change in US foreign and security policy is 
especially obvious in regard to the conflict in Af-
ghanistan. In a speech at the United States Military 
Academy at West Point in December 2009, Presi-
dent Obama announced a gradual drawdown of 
US troops starting in 2011. Then, at the Interna-
tional Conference on Afghanistan held in London 
in January 2010, the international community gen-
erally adopted these withdrawal plans. The core 
of the new approach was the beginning of a new 
“counterinsurgency” strategy (stationing an addi-
tional 38,000 soldiers to fight the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda in the region bordering Pakistan), a vague 
formulation about handing over security respon-
sibilities from the ISAF to the ANSF starting in 
winter 2010/11 (“transition phase”), and the rein-
tegration of players who are ready to renounce vi-
olence – a euphemism for negotiating with mod-
erate members of the Taliban. In addition, at the 
London Conference Afghanistan’s potential to 
serve as a “land-bridge” between various regions – 
South and Central Asia, the Near East and East 
Asia – was pointed out and the need to seek a re-
gional solution to the conflict was emphasized. 
The route chosen in London was followed in the 
following years. In a speech in June 2011, Presi-
dent Obama confirmed the drawdown of 10,000 
American soldiers by the end of 2011 and the 
withdrawal of another 33,000 soldiers by summer 
2012. The transfer of security responsibilities from 
the ISAF to the ANSF should be complete by 2014. 
A “Regional Solution” for Afghanistan?
Efforts to find a “regional solution” for the conflict 
in Afghanistan translated into a meeting of region-
al actors in Istanbul in November 2011 at an Af-
ghanistan conference that was chaired by Turkey, 
where the Central Asian states, China, Iran, India 
and Pakistan discussed the future of Afghanistan. 
Although the US and other “Western” states did 
not participate in the conference, to a certain de-
gree, it was a result of the change in the US strat-
egy for Afghanistan. The US itself is increasingly 
focusing on a region that is referred to as “Greater 
Central Asia” or the “Heart of Asia.” This is based 
on the conviction that in Central Asia, which is 
generally cut off from the world market, only 
transregional economic integration and coopera-
tion will be able to provide prosperity and stabili-
ty, prevent extremism and also overcome the dis-
agreements between the various states. For some 
years, the idea of a “New Silk Route” initiative – 
reviving the old trade routes of the Silk Road – 
has been central to the American discourse. With 
copper, rare earth metals and other resources, Af-
ghanistan would be an appropriate production 
site, as well as an infrastructure node and a trans-
port hub between the various regions. Just as the 
old Silk Road did not just connect East and West, 
but also ran along a North–South axis, the New 
Silk Road would benefit from Afghanistan’s posi-
tion between Central and South Asia and the Mid-
dle and Far East. Extensive foreign investment 
in infrastructure projects, as well as the lowered 
trade barriers that are provided for in the Afghan-
istan–Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA), 
should ensure the economic growth that is need-
ed. According to the Communiqué of the London 
Conference, the South Asian Association for Re-
gional Cooperation (SAARC), the Shanghai Co-
operation Organization (SCO), the Regional Eco-
nomic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan 
(RECCA) and the Istanbul Process1 are all suited 
to serve as cooperation fora. Although closer eco-
nomic integration of the region around Afghan-
istan could have a stabilizing effect in the long 
term, it is difficult to imagine the regional play-
ers cooperating in the short- or mid-term to try 
to solve the conflict in Afghanistan. Most observ-
ers agree that the strongly divergent – and partly 
completely opposing – security interests pursued 
by Afghanistan’s neighbors make efficient inter-
mediate-term cooperation impossible (Tellis 2010; 
Berg Harpviken 2010). This is shown not just by 
the meager results of the Istanbul Process, but also 
by the stalling of projects that involve the region-
al economy, such as the TAPI gas pipeline from 
Turkmenistan through Afghanistan into Pakistan 
and then India, or the Central Asia–South Asia Re-
gional Electricity Market (CASA–1000).
1 The Istanbul Process, named after the conference cited above, 
refers to the regional players’ dialogue regarding the situa-
tion in Afghanistan. In June 2012, representatives from all of 
Afghanistan’s neighboring countries and international and 
regional organizations took part in a follow-up conference in 
Kabul titled “Heart of Asia,” which was also attended by 15 
observer states (including Germany and the US).
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The Positions of Regional Players
China and the SCO
Since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, rela-
tions between China and Afghanistan have been 
revived through the reopening of the Chinese em-
bassy in Kabul in 2002, and China’s increased eco-
nomic investment. China’s interest in Afghanistan 
became crystal clear when China made the largest 
direct foreign investment in the history of Afghan-
istan. In spring 2008, the Chinese were able to con-
clude a contract worth 3.5 billion USD to develop 
the Aynak copper mine in Logar province. The 28-
km2 mining license area is believed to contain cop-
per worth 88 billion USD. In return for the pros-
pecting rights, the Chinese investors have com-
mitted themselves to building a coal-fired pow-
er plant, a freight railway line from the Chinese 
province Xinjiang through Tajikistan to Afghani-
stan and Pakistan, and a mosque. 
China’s growing interest in Afghanistan is 
connected to its goal of developing its western – 
economically weaker – provinces. In order to de-
velop, these provinces need access to raw mate-
rials and new trade routes, which is why China’s 
government is striving to tie them more close-
ly to Central and South Asia, as well as to Iran. 
This goal is also clearly emphasized in the 12th 
Five-Year Plan (2011–2015).2 Because of its numer-
ous investments in Afghanistan, China has a spe-
cial interest in the country’s stability, most impor-
tantly regarding the security of its extensive in-
vestment services as well as the on-site Chinese 
workers. 
Besides these economic aspects, regional se-
curity in and around Afghanistan is important to 
China’s government for another reason – the con-
stant fear of unrest in the Chinese province of Xin-
jiang that borders Afghanistan, as well as in Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The Chinese 
leadership’s concern about the future of Afghani-
stan after 2014 and interest in promoting stability 
for the entire region was stimulated by two events, 
the first of which was violent clashes between 
the Uighur minority and the Han population in 
Urumqi in July 2009. The riots were the most bru-
2 China’s investments in the port of Gwadar, Pakistan, the ex-
tension of the oil pipeline between Kazakhstan and the Chi-
nese province of Xinjiang, the construction of the Turkmen-
istan–Xinjiang gas pipeline, as well as the conclusion of a 
25-year energy contract between China and Iran are included 
in the plan. 
tal and the most serious in the autonomous region 
of Xinjiang since 1949. Behind the unrest was an 
incident in a toy factory in the southern Chinese 
province of Guangdong (Godehardt 2009). The 
uprising in Urumqi brought home to the Chinese 
government the fragility of Uighur–Han relations 
in Xinjiang. The smallest tremor within or – more 
importantly, with an eye to Afghanistan – outside 
China could have direct consequences for Xin- 
jiang’s stability. 
The extremely brutal disputes between the 
Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan in 
June 2010 are considered to be the second event 
that increased Chinese government concern about 
Afghanistan’s future. In this context, Chinese ex-
perts were mostly shocked by how Otunbaye-
va’s interim government temporarily lost control 
of the south of the country. It also became clear 
that there is no possibility of effectively contain-
ing the repercussions of such a crisis within the 
framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organi-
zation (SCO). Chinese experts repeatedly empha-
sized that, in view of the situation in Afghanistan, 
this was a shortcoming of the SCO. 
These two events, as well as the scheduled 
drawdown of ISAF troops by the end of 2014 have 
led China’s government to more actively seek to 
integrate Afghanistan both regionally and bilater-
ally. To this end, at the latest SCO Summit in Bei-
jing in early June 2012, Afghanistan was accorded 
the observer status that Afghan president Karzai 
had sought since 2011. Even if this was a largely 
symbolic gesture, it still makes plain that the states 
that border Afghanistan want to assume greater 
responsibility, and it is also a first important and 
logical step to further incorporating Afghanistan 
into the SCO. After all, a SCO–Afghanistan Con-
tact Group that focuses on the illegal drug trade 
from Afghanistan to Central Asia and Xinjiang 
province has existed since 2005, and in 2009 an 
SCO–Afghanistan Action Plan to combat terror-
ism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime 
was agreed. The Chinese suspect that Uighur ter-
rorists were partly trained in Afghanistan. Follow-
ing the SCO Summit in Beijing in June 2012, Kar-
zai and Chinese president Hu Jintao upgraded the 
relations between Afghanistan and China by sign-
ing a “strategic partnership.” This agreement tes-
tifies to China’s wish to make a long-term commit-
ment in and for Afghanistan. Hu additionally em-
phasized that the Chinese government would en-
courage Chinese companies to invest in Afghani-
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stan, and would be actively engaged in maintain-
ing regional security. 
The Chinese government has recognized that 
the future of Afghanistan will impact the entire re-
gion, including the western Chinese province of 
Xinjiang. For that reason, China’s interest in the 
stability of Afghanistan should be taken quite se-
riously. However, it remains to be seen whether 
the Chinese government is ready to assume more 
responsibility for reconstructing Afghanistan be-
sides making direct investments, and what role 
the SCO could really play. The SCO’s possibilities 
will be particularly limited by the fact that neither 
China nor Russia is interested in American par-
tici pation (for example, as an observer state) in the 
SCO. But it is precisely the exclusion of the US and 
other European players that creates misgivings on 
the part of the Americans with regard to the SCO’s 
direction as a regional organization in view of the 
developments in Afghanistan.
India
India, too, is following NATO’s plans for with-
drawing from Afghanistan with great concern be-
cause a post-2014 destabilization of the country 
would immediately threaten its security. On the 
one hand, the Indian government fears its arch ri-
val Pakistan’s increased influence on Afghanistan. 
Pakistan’s security doctrine views Afghanistan as 
a strategic area for retreat in case of a war with 
India, and Islamabad is clearly striving to exert 
more influence in Kabul. On the other hand, New 
Delhi sees the danger of a destabilized Afghani-
stan or the Taliban’s return to power as being ac-
companied by the strengthening of terror net-
works in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Novem-
ber 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai by members of 
the Pakistan-based group Lashkar-e-Taiba dem-
onstrated India’s vulnerability to Islamist terror-
ists. Against this background, the announcement 
of the ISAF troops’ drawdown triggered a lively 
debate among India’s security policy elites about 
the possibilities and limits of India’s commitment 
to Afghanistan.
After the fall of the Taliban, India began to par-
ticipate in the reconstruction of Afghanistan; its 
pledge of 2 billion USD made it the fifth-largest 
donor country (Ganguly 2012: 4). Construction 
of the Afghan Parliament building and the high-
way between Zaranj and Delaram that connects 
southwest Afghanistan to the Iranian border are 
just two of India’s prestigious projects in Afghan-
istan. New Delhi has also committed itself to ma-
ny smaller development projects, for example, in 
the health sector, and annually offers 500 scholar-
ships for Afghan students. As a result, India en-
joys a certain benevolence on the part of the Af-
ghan population, and the fact that President Kar-
zai studied in India contributes to the Afghan gov-
ernment’s sympathetic view of India. 
For a long time, India tried to strictly lim-
it its commitment in Afghanistan to reconstruc-
tion and development cooperation. The only 
tentative exception was Afghan membership in 
SAARC, which represents India’s effort to incor-
porate Afghanistan into the region of South Asia. 
India’s general reticence regarding Afghanistan 
reflected New Delhi’s regional policy of noninter-
vention, and can also be traced to the USA’s wish 
to check Pakistani–Indian competition for influ-
ence in Afghanistan (Ganguly 2012: 3). Pakistan 
fears that increased Indian influence in Afghani-
stan could result in its “encirclement” by enemy 
states, and it is exerting significant pressure on the 
US to prevent stepped-up Indian involvement in 
the country. 
However, since 2011 it has been possible to ob-
serve signs of change in India’s Afghanistan pol-
icy, with the two countries signing an agreement 
for a strategic partnership in October of that year 
which was Afghanistan’s first such agreement. In 
it, India declares its readiness to train and equip 
Afghan security forces. This change in the Indi-
an policy on Afghanistan was largely possible on-
ly after relations between the US and Pakistan had 
deteriorated in the wake of the killing of Osama 
Bin Laden on Pakistani territory in May 2011. In 
the recent past, the US has repeatedly supported 
India’s increased engagement in Afghanistan. So, 
for example, in June 2012 Indian external affairs 
minister S.M. Krishna and the American secretary 
of state Hillary Clinton agreed to hold a trilater-
al dialogue with the Afghan government. Despite 
the USA’s willingness to grant India a larger role 
in Afghanistan’s future, active military engage-
ment by India in Afghanistan remains most un-
likely. Besides, it is difficult to imagine that India 
really will become a driving force for a “region-
al solution” to stabilize Afghanistan. On the one 
hand, such a prominent Indian role would be met 
with great resistance by Pakistan – and in spite of 
the estrangement between Washington and Islam-
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abad, the US would hardly be ready to completely 
end its cooperation with Pakistan. Moreover, In-
dia is still wrangling with the question of playing 
a more proactive role in the region. The principles 
of sovereignty and nonintervention remain deep-
ly rooted in India’s foreign policy, and the fear of 
encountering resistance in the region will contin-
ue to prevent the Indian government from taking 
a leading role in the stabilization of Afghanistan. 
Other Actors
Besides China, the Central Asian states, India and 
Pakistan, there are other actors that are also inter-
ested in how Afghanistan develops. These include 
Iran and Turkey. Because of the flood of refugees 
and the drug trafficking from Afghanistan, Iran is 
directly affected by its neighbor’s security situa-
tion. Iran has always been involved in Afghani-
stan’s politics because of ethnic and religious affil-
iations. For example, Iran supported – with India – 
the Northern Alliance against the Taliban (who 
were supported by Pakistan) in the Afghan Civ-
il War in the 1990s. The drawdown of ISAF troops 
has triggered contradictory reactions in Iran: on 
the one hand the withdrawal of its arch enemy, 
the US, from the immediate vicinity is welcomed, 
while on the other hand a possible strengthen-
ing of the Taliban is hardly in Iran’s interest. Te-
heran’s policy on Afghanistan is accordingly in-
consistent: there are reports about Iran delivering 
weapons to the Taliban with the aim of weakening 
the US in Afghanistan, but Iran also continues to 
support Shiite groups that are hostile to the Tali-
ban. Such politics hardly make Iran a reliable part-
ner for stabilizing Afghanistan – and the US alone 
has no chance of winning over Iran as a support-
er of its transition plans for Afghanistan. The Ira-
nian leadership reacted very angrily to the signing 
of a strategic partnership agreement between the 
US and Afghanistan in May 2012, and even threat-
ened to expel a million Afghan refugees. Beyond 
that, Teheran is actively seeking to make use of its 
own “soft power” in Afghanistan in order to be 
better able to fill a possible power vacuum after 
the ISAF troops have left. A third of Afghanistan’s 
media are supported by Iran, both financially and 
in terms of content, and in 2010 Teheran invested 
500 million USD in reconstructing Afghanistan – 
mostly in projects such as building Shiite schools 
(Ferris-Rotman 2012). 
A more constructive contribution to stabilizing 
Afghanistan can be expected from Turkey. As host 
of the Istanbul Conference in 2011, Turkey made 
a name for itself as a driving force in the effort to 
seek a regional solution. By virtue of its member-
ship in NATO and its good relations with Paki-
stan, and in view of the AKP government’s active 
foreign policy, Turkey has the potential to become 
an important player in Afghanistan. One such in-
stance is Turkey’s insistence on Pakistan’s partici-
pation at the NATO summit in Chicago, after Pak-
istan had closed the supply route on its territory 
to NATO forces in the wake of a military strike by 
the US. Evidence of Turkey’s increasing involve-
ment in the region around Afghanistan is also 
shown by it being granted the status of SCO dia-
logue partner in June 2012.
Conclusion
The next two and a half years will be decisive for 
Afghanistan’s future, with the US and its Western 
allies banking on a combination of financial assis-
tance, the presence of a smaller military contin-
gent in the country, a political dialogue within Af-
ghanistan and the growing assumption of respon-
sibility by regional actors. However, this last as-
pect is turning out to be especially problematic be-
cause of the different interests of the various play-
ers. Although countries like India or Turkey are 
capable of building bridges between the US and 
other regional actors, the regional actors remain 
very divided. For this reason there will probably 
be no regional solution for Afghanistan; instead, 
the danger exists that in the years after 2014 Af-
ghanistan will again become the theater of proxy 
conflicts between external – particularly regional – 
powers.
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